We analyze in this study what could have caused herding in the stock market. Information cascades have often been considered as a major cause. However, we present in this study evidences inconsistent with that hypothesis. Our analysis is in support of an alternative theory based on search cost of investors. Specifically, previous works studied daily data or those with lower frequency based on a herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) . We adopt instead the measure of Patterson and Sharma (2006) and argue that the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) characterize herding phenomenon better. Our analysis supports their hypothesis employing intraday order book data. We find that stronger order flow herding is driven by lower transactions cost. Herding tend to occur in trading of high-cap, high turnover stocks, which contradicts prediction of the information cascade hypothesis. Information cascade effect, if any, is actually stronger near market close than at open. Therefore our study suggests that herding could be related more to intrinsic search cost structure of investors rather than information related factors.
I. Introduction
Herding behavior of investors has been a central issue of literatures in behavioral finance.
Particularly, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) defined 'herding' as a common investing pattern from clustered investors within a given period. Banerjee (1992) considered 'herded trading behavior' as forgoing investors' own information and following others' strategies. Information cascades have often been considered as a theory characterizing herding behavior, where informed traders ignore their own private signal of information and trade in response to observed trades in the market.
However, in a given period, this characterization has to be applicable to all assets in a certain market. One class of participants would follow trading actions of another, and information quality in the period has to be poor to drive that, as argued in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992, BHW) and Avery and Zemsky (1999, AZ) . Most of the literatures study herding behavior of institutional investors and primarily in a medium horizon time frame. On a daily basis, herding is suggested to be short-lived and, as suggested by Christoffersen and Tang (2009) , herding increases with data frequency, and that herding should be less significant in stocks with larger size and higher turnover. We find, however, in our study that investor herding, on a intraday basis, is not consistent with the prediction of information cascade hypothesis as herding is more pronounced in stocks with good information quality of the larger firms, with higher turnover and lower price-book ratios.
Herding is significantly related to price spreads between buy and sell orders, especially at market open, suggesting an alternative model is needed to characterize the herding phenomenon.
Generally, herding implies a leader-follower behavior pattern in terms of trading. Henker, Henker, and Mitsios (2006) , argued that herding should be considered in an intraday context as market participants, at times of extreme price volatility, observe one another in trading patterns to interpret news rather than rely on own private models. Extreme price movements within a short period of time, according to laboratory experiment of sequential trading by Guarino and Cipriani (2008) , could generate a no-trade information cascade, rather than trading concentration, in the presence of transactions cost. So the implications of BHW and AZ may have to be modified in the analysis of trading with high frequency. The commonly used herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV) cannot capture the sequential interactions of market participants especially in an intra-day framework. In addition, quote-driven markets have been the focus of previous works on herding and buy/sell orders have to be imputed. However, order-driven trading mechanism, popular in the new electronic trading mechanism around the world, records directly buy and sell orders. The sequential patterns of order flows characterize trading intensity and information distribution, particularly within a very short period of time, of market participants. Also in an intra-day context, herding measurement could be flawed without controlling for factors like day trading, portfolio rebalancing and ETF portfolio tracking. We therefore intend to address the above issues in this study with a cost-based framework of trading concentration as well as a herding measure focusing on order flow patterns.
Vayanos and Wang (2007, VW) introduced a search-based model of asset trading, where search or trading cost differs and investors are constrained financially. Trading concentration occurs in a clientele equilibrium where investors with similar cost choose to trade similar assets. The asset with concentrated trading tends to trade at a higher price than one with identical-payoff but require higher trading cost in a search-based equilibrium of VW. We show in our analysis that stronger order flow herding is driven by lower transactions cost. We also find that that herding in stocks with large cap, high turnover and low P/B ratio is more apparent in stocks with returns ranking at the highest deciles, indicating herding results in relative higher prices. Interestingly, information cascade effect decreases as market goes further away from open or near close. Individuals exhibit stronger herding phenomenon, but herding of institutionals are driven more by lower transactions costs. While herding of individual is inconsistent with BHW, that of institutionals seems to support VW more explicitly.
To measure herding, we adopted the bootstrapped run test method of Patterson and Sharma (2006, PS) , which captures intraday order sequences in particular. Previous works on data with lower frequency relies on LSV, which is more easily to be constructed within a longer time frame.
It does not consider the intensity of trading concentration as trading proceeds, but uses only the proportion of participants buying and selling within a period. To the extent that order flow matters more in shorter periods, LSV cannot be expected to depict characteristics of trading concentration with high frequency data. Runs of buy or sell orders provide more realistic characterization of herding intuitively as well as statistically. The t-test for the LSV measure may suffer from distributional problems when measuring window gets shorter and shorter, while the test for PS runs relies on sample-generated critical values and is thus more powerful in making inferences. As LSV measure within a given period may include orders in or not in runs, PS model gives a more rigorous definition of herding than LSV.
PS method also does not require herding to accommodate extreme market conditions.
In emerging financial markets, turnover and market volume are often generated by individual investors. Herding of individuals is worth studying in these markets as it interacts with institutional herding, as suggested in Nofsinger and Sias (1999) Australian Stock Exchange and discovered that volatility rises with frequency of data in a given period. The degree of non-normality exhibited in intra-day data, which posed as a problem for the t-test of LSV, is not necessarily information-related but implies certain ties to herding. Cont and Bouchard (2000) investigated how the fat-tailed distribution of stock returns is related to herding behavior, as the deviation from normality under high frequency observation cannot be accounted for by ordinary statistical modeling. To explore further on these issues, we focuses beyond herding phenomenon itself to examine intraday interaction between individual and institutional investors.
We studied intraday herding behavior of the four types of investors in the Taiwan stock market.
There are several elements that distinguish our study from other literatures on herding. Similar to
Christoffersen and Tang (2009) we also used daily and intra-day tick data, but the order book data allow us to identify buy and sell orders directly. Investors type, which includes individuals and three types of institutionals, the proprietary dealers, the investment trust, and QFII, are also identified.
The identification investor type helps clarifying if herding is driven by information cascade in the sense of BHW or a search-cost based motivation according to VW. Our empirical results support the latter rather than the much more popular former. We have also found that individual investor's herding follows that of the QFII and investment trust, which suggests the search move of individual investor lags behind institutional investors. As individual investors accounting for 70% of the overall trading volume, their longer trading horizon and lagging behind institutional in information processing lead them to pay a higher transaction cost. Foreign institutionals are seen to herd more in stocks with the three characteristics mentioned above than local institutionals. Yang (2007) showed how marginal institutional investors engage in short-term trading due to cost factors compared to other institutional investor going after long-term values of stocks. Ting (2009) indicated the, within a given period, foreign institutional investors in Taiwan tend to follow those with a higher turnover rate. The short horizon of marginal foreign institutional investor may have induced them to concentrate in trading stocks with the said characteristics.
The main implication of our results would help, on the one hand, investors in general to locate at any given period the most cost-efficient market to trade, which lowers average trading cost and enhance market trading volume. On the other hand, our analysis contributes to regulators as well as exchanges to understand if certain extreme herding phenomenon entails ramification or any other actions. Unnecessary market alarms could be greatly reduced and market efficiency is hence improved. This study also provides an explanation for the portion of volatility that is not due to changes in fundamentals or other known effects, while also adding to the literature on further understanding of herding. The results could prove highly relevant in achieving a better understanding of market functioning and serve both academics and practitioners, given that an understanding of which variables affect volatility and the nature of their influence could contribute to much more accurate forecasting and, furthermore, to the definition of new risk measures or new hedging strategies. A brief literature review and discussion of how to measure herding are given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Section IV gives detailed discussion and compares implications of our findings on the two competing hypotheses. Conclusion is given in Section V.
II. What causes herding, and how to measure it?
The herding behavior is considered an anomaly that challenges the efficient market paradigm.
Although this behavior is considered irrational, it can be rational at an individual level. At a group level it is irrational as it leads to mispricing. Literatures argue that the herding arises from the interaction among agents as they copy each other's decisions. The models of BHW and Bannerjee (1992) considered that individuals make their decisions sequentially at a time, taking into account the decisions of the individuals preceding them. The model proposed by Cont and Bouchaud (2000) considered, instead of a sequential decision process, a random communication structure. Random interactions between agents lead to a heterogeneous market structure. AZ argues that information cascades will be short-lived and fragile as one contrarian trade from the herd can quickly stop an information cascade.
What causes herding
The BHW model assumes all investors can invest either in asset A or B -but not both -at zero cost. An investor with t predecessors will choose A if and only if the conditional probability 
A pattern of conformity can arise if initial predictions coincide and the inferred information dominates the private information of subsequent decision makers. The followers go along with a consensus prediction, even if it would not be the "correct" prediction made only on the basis of their own sample.
The AZ model is an extended BHW model with a flexible price. The price is set by a market maker who efficiently incorporates all publicly available information. The decision of an investor is straightforward. All information is revealed, and therefore it is incorporated into the price immediately after each decision. The price is a martingale with respect to public information, i.e., Market 1 has not only more sellers than market 2, but also more buyers, and a higher buyer-seller ratio. Moreover, the price that any given buyer expects to pay is higher in market 1. Since there are more sellers in market 1, buyers' search times are shorter. Therefore, holding all else constant, buyers prefer entering into market 1. To restore equilibrium, prices in market 1 must be higher than in market 2. This is accomplished by higher buying pressure in market 1, i.e., higher buyer-seller ratio. In the resulting equilibrium, there is a clientele effect. Investors with high switching rates, who have a stronger preference for short search times, prefer market 1 despite the higher prices. On the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are more patient, value more the lower prices in market 2. The clientele effect is, in turn, what accounts for the larger measure of sellers in market 1 since the high-switching-rate buyers turn faster into sellers. So in essence, cost characteristics of investors determine concentration of trading and prices, rather than information about the assets.
Individual investors trading for own accounts with unleveraged funds are supposed to have lower switching rates and prefer market 2 in the model above. However, when market moves fast, lack of knowledge could elevate their switching rates so they turn to trade in market 1 instead.
Naturally, there should be more herding from the individual investors in an bullish stock market according to prediction (a) and (b). In this market individual investor may prefer to trade stocks with larger market capitalization, higher turnover and lower price-to-book ratios, which require lower search costs. According to prediction (c) above, we would expect the stock characteristic preference to be more eminent in stocks enjoying higher prices than others. [ This measure has one major drawback: it does not consider the volume of manager's trading.
The measure uses only the number of managers buying and selling, without regard to the monetary value they trade. Wermers (1999) thus proposed a modification of this herding measure in order to capture differences of behavior when traders are buying or selling.
Cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD)
Christie and Huang (1995) take another approach and consider aggregate market herding in equity return data. They measure the market impact of herding by considering the dispersion or the cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) of returns. The rationale for the use of this dispersion measure is that if market wide herding occurs, returns on individual stocks will be more than usually clustered around the market return as investors suppress their private opinion in favor of the market consensus. Traditional asset pricing theory predicts that the dispersion of returns increases with the aggregate market return due to varying stock sensitivities to market returns. Since dispersion measures the average proximity of individual returns to the mean, when all stock returns move in perfect unison with the market, dispersion is zero. When individual returns differ from the market return, however, the level of dispersion increases. Christie and Huang (1995) contend that when investors ignore the idiosyncratic features of stocks, we would expect to see lower than average level of dispersion during periods characterized by large market movements. portfolio move together, then during periods where herding behavior prevails average volatility will be low and dispersion will also be low. 
Data Frequency
The data frequency of many studies precludes the detection of herding that occurs within the trading day. Considering intraday data would uncover issues ignored in studies with lower data frequency yet important to the understanding of herding. Gleason not necessarily related to the arrival of information (Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989) , and could be explained as herding. If a large number of agents coordinate their actions, the imbalance between buy and sell orders will cause a substantial price change (Bouchaud, 2002) . Shortening observation period reduces possibility of extreme price movements and helps the study of herding under normal market condition. The distribution of order data used in this study provides a more comprehensive characterization of investors' intended market moves than realized transaction prices.
Runs Test
Most of the studies carried out to test for herding in capital markets have proved inconclusive. The measure of LSV relies on t-test to determine significance of herding, which is affected by distribution characteristics of data. As LSV measure relies on the proportion of market participants buying or selling within a given period, the complexity of trading motives of various participants dilutes its content of herding intensity. To the extent that measuring herding makes more sense in a short period as pointed out by Christoffersen and Tang herding, the statistic should take significantly negative values, since the actual number of runs will be lower than expected.
Where i r is the actual number of type i runs (up runs, down runs or zero runs), n is the total number of trades executed on asset j on day t, ½ is a discontinuity adjustment parameter and i p is the probability of finding a type of run i. Under asymptotic conditions, the statistic ) , , ( t j i x has a normal distribution with zero mean and variance
So the herding intensity statistic is expressed as
which has an asymptotic distribution of N(0,1). Mood (1940) 
III. Data and empirical results
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from We divided each daily session between 9:00 AM and 1:30 PM into 9 intervals with 30 minutes in each interval. As our data contains flags identifying the type of investors as proprietary dealers, investment trust, QFII and individuals, we proceed with analysis for each type of investors.
Percentages of trading volume in the stock market accounted for by them over the last ten years in Table I . QFII's percentages have apparently grown much faster than the other two types. As a matter of fact, QFII owns one third of the total market capitalization as of end of 2008, which produces the one quarter of daily volume as shown in Table I . Table V breaks down Table IV by 30-minute intervals.
The distribution of medians is similar to that across time intervals as in Table II , and across different types of investors as in Table IV . For all and each type of investors, we bootstrapped their 1%, 5%
and 10% critical values. Table VI gives the critical values for all stocks as well as for stocks in top and bottom return deciles. The bootstrapped 30-minute intra-day critical values and percentages of significance for the PS herding measures computed in Table V are given in Table VII . The distribution across time and investor is similar to that in Table V . Across all investors at 1% significance level, the opening interval is the one with the highest percentage, about 70% higher than the bootstrapped percentage. The closing interval has the lowest significance percentage, about 28% below. Among all types of investors, QFII's exhibit the strongest herding behavior in the opening interval, followed by individuals and investment trusts. Herding of proprietary dealers is quite different from the other three types, peaking at mid-day sessions.
The distribution of significant herding percentage in Table VII suggest that intraday herding occurs most likely in the opening interval, which is consistent with predictions of information-based hypotheses on herding. However, if we analyze further how buy and sell orders are distributed during days when herding is significant, we will observe a different pattern. Table VIII gives the sizes of buy and sell orders, in thousand shares, for all days where herding is significant at 1%. The ratios of average buy orders to average sell orders, for days when herding is significant at 1%, is slightly higher than for the entire period. Among investor types, buy-sell ratios are greater than 1 for all institutionals during days of herding, and the ratios for QFII's and Proprietary Dealers are higher than their counterpart in all periods. If we look further into the opening intervals, we find that overall buy-sell ratios during herding days are actually lower than the entire period. But for the closing interval, not only the ratios are generally higher than those in the opening interval, but those in herding days are also higher than in the entire period. This indicates that, on the one hand, buying force in the closing interval is stronger than that in the opening interval, which is inconsistent with the information cascade hypothesis as closing interval on average is not one with large amount of information. On the other hand, the fact that herding intensifies buying over selling in herding days, for institutionals in both the opening and the closing intervals, suggest the phenomenon is consistent with predictions of the VW hypothesis. There is a higher buyer-seller ratio in herding days, especially during the closing intervals within these days. If we look at stocks in the top and bottom return deciles, the buy-sell ratios are, as expected, higher in the top return decile. In the bottom return decile, buy-sell ratios are in general lower than 1. But in both the opening and closing intervals of herding days for the two return deciles, the ratios are higher than in the entire period.
Buy-sell ratios in the closing intervals are uniformly higher, around 20%, than in the opening intervals. Even for the bottom return decile, there appears to be a stronger, about 24% in magnitude, buying force near market close than right after market open. These findings are not consistent with the information cascade hypothesis but supportive of the search cost model of herding. Although percentages of significant herding statistics in the closing interval are the lowest among all intervals as shown in Tabel VII, the trading concentration from large amount of orders in Table II still exhibit high buyer/seller ratio as predicted in a clientele equilibrium of VW.
We now turn our attention to stock characteristics and their relations to daily and intra-day herding by different types of investors. Table IX , and more pronounced in stocks with the highest returns. Across intraday intervals, orders in the opening interval exhibit patterns most against the information cascade hypothesis, with the strongest γ's among all intervals. The implication seems to suggest that the information cascade effect, if any, should be stronger at market close. Table XI reports 
Where BSD stands for the price difference between sell and the buy orders associated with all the transaction prices averaged over a given day. Positive values of the coefficient estimate suggest lower price spreads accompanied herding. This effect is the stongest for QFII's and individuals, and decreases from open to close. This finding is consistent with the distribution of buy and sell orders reported in Table VIII . We have also examined specifically two subcategories where MC k =1, TO k =1, PB k =5 (stocks with the poorest information quality) and MC k =5, TO k =5, PB k =1 (stocks with the best information quality) to determine how search cost effect behave there. Results show that herding is not so much related to search cost in stocks with the greatest information quality as it is to those with the poorest information quality.
In order to identity how herding pattern varies among investor types, we report in Table XII As 
IV. Discussion on the cause of herding
The preliminary results of our analysis indicate that, according the method of PS (2006), herding behavior is not consistent with the information cascade hypothesis. First of all, individuals and QFII are the two investor types with the stronger herding behavior. They are supposed to be the most and the least informationally informed in the stock market. This evidence is inconsistent with the cascading order of information among investors according the BWH. Our results also indicate that herding is stronger in stocks with the highest returns during the data period. Herding is also more prominent in days of bull market than in bear market. Although opening intraday interval is most likely trigger information related market moves and contains higher percentage of significant herding days, the buy-sell ratios are uniformly higher in the closing interval, even for stocks with the lowest returns in the data period.
Categorizing stocks according to certain characteristics leads us to further conclusion that herding is not consistent with information-based hypotheses. The majority of the trading volume tends to herd on stocks with the highest market capitalizations, which are supposed to be of the best information quality according to AZ, BHW and Sias (2004) . The prediction of these literatures is that herding should be less likely to appear there. The herding of QFII is consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997) , which argued that home bias is a factor, but as results in this study are obtained in a different context we would need other models to support them. Similar argument applies to the analysis of herding by stock turnovers. As a dynamic indicator, daily turnover also reflects information quality in the sense of AZ and BHW. Our finding is opposite to their predictions, suggesting furthermore that behavior in this market does not support the information cascade theory.
The analysis with respect to price-book ratio is also inconsistent with information theory. Majority of investors herd on trading stocks with low price-book ratio suggest their focus is on stocks likely to be under-valued by market. As the ratio is well known and does not change rapidly in a short period, it is difficult to conceive lots of orders submitted to capture information on something stable.
Proprietary dealers and investment trust tend to herd on medium or high a P/B ratio stock, suggesting their behavior might be related to factors other than information.
The search model of VW is based on search cost of various types of investors in the market.
Investors with higher search cost, or shorter search horizon, should value liquidity more than others.
According to VW, insurance companies have long horizon than the hedge funds. Similarly, we could consider in the Taiwan market individuals and QFII as having lower search horizons than the other two types of institutional investors. In a clientele equilibrium, investors with high shorter horizons generate more trading, and this reduces search times and trading costs. They have a stronger preference for short search times, preferring trading in the respective 'sub-market' despite the higher prices. Since there are more sellers in the sub-market with shorter search time, buyers' search times are shorter. Therefore, holding all else constant, buyers and sellers follow one another entering into market. According to buy-sell ratios reported in Table VIII, Table X , the search cost effect happens to be the strongest, as found in Table XI. QFII's Information-based hypotheses are not supported by the examination of market-wide herding under up or down market direction. In our analysis, herding only occur in an up market, not in a down one. The notion of panic selling in a bearish market is supposed to drive up herding behavior, but results in Table VIII give none at all. If we perceive the up market as one with low search time then we would observe more substantial herding. The down market with confusing signals about individual stocks is not ideal for the short-horizon majority of market and hence we do not see significant herding results.
V. Conclusion
This study presentsa set of intra-day order book data to study cause of herding behavior in the securities market. We adopted a herding measure that is specifically ideal for high frequency data.
Herding measures are not only on a daily level, but also within intra-day time intervals. Although the analysis is the study is still preliminary, we have found strong evidences against the popular information cascade hypothesis for herding. Specifically, we found that herding on an intraday level occurs in stocks with the highest returns and more prominent in days of bull market. Market as a whole, and individuals in particular, is found to herd on stocks with high market capitalization, high turnover and low price-book ratio, patterns incompatible with information-induced herding. A simple regression yields results where QFII and individuals exhibited herding on stocks with falling prices, and a VAR regression produces a significant support for individuals to follow QFII in herding. These evidences do not support the hypothesis of information cascade for herding.
We propose in this study an alternative hypothesis to explain the herding phenomena we find.
The search model for trading concentration by Vayanos and Wang (2007) can fit in well with our analysis. QFII and individual investors, facing more uncertainty inherent in individual stocks, have shorter search horizon and higher search costs in trading individual stocks. As short-horizon investors tend to follow others in making buying and selling decisions, the observed herding behavior near market closes can be justified. High market cap and turnover, and low price-book ratio are also characteristics of a market that is ideal for individual and QFII investors to rush in to trade when they observe trading concentration emerges. Therefore we consider the VW model as superior to the information cascade theory of AZ and BHW in explaining intra-day and daily herding of various types of investors.
Although we have presented valid arguments regarding the central issue of this study, there are areas we do have to work on to enrich our study with.
We have yet to investigate further stocks with statistically significant herding phenomenon for more evidence supporting the search cost model.
Other analysis, such as trading motives of investors, evidence on sequence or development of trading concentration and the dynamics of search equilibrium need to be added to the current model as well. Estimates of β's for autocorrelation terms are all extremely significant and are not reported. Standard deviations are in the parentheses and ** denotes significant a t 1%.
Table XII VAR Analysis of Intra-day Herding Measures among Investors
The VAR regression is based on the following models, Standard deviations are in the parentheses and ** denotes significant at 1%.
